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In th~ Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CLIFFORD G. FOLKMAN, Administrator 
of the estate of Marie P. Folkman, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ERNEST L. JENSEN, 
Defendant and . .Appellant 
·sTATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of his de-
ceased wife, Marie P. Folkman, seeks to recover damages 
for her alleged· wrongful death. She left surviving her, 
in addition to her ·husband, two minor children, Larry, 
age four, and Janet, age eleven months. 
The defendant is the Chief of the Fire. Department 
of Weber County, Utah. 
The accident which caused the death of the deceased 
occurred at the intersection of Grant and Patterson Ave-
nues in Ogden City on the evening of July 23, 1948, at 
about eight o'clock p. m., by reason of a collision he-
twee~ a fire truck driven by defendant and an auto-
mobile driven by plaintiff, in which deceased was riding. 
The case was tried to the Court, sitting without a 
jury. The pleadings raised the following issues: 
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A. "\\r as defendant guilty of negligence proxima-
tely causing the accident~ 
B. Was plaintiff himself guilty of contributory 
negligence which caused or contributed to 
causing said accident~ 
C. Was the deceased also guilty of contributory 
negligenee which caused or contributed to 
causing said accident. 
The trial Court made Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law which may be summarized as follows: 
A. That the defendant was guilty of negligence 
in the operation of said fire truck a.nd that 
such negligence w~as the proximate cause of 
the accident and resulting death of deceased. 
B. That. the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence in the operation of the car in which 
the deceased was riding and that his con-
tributory negligence proximately caused or 
contributed to causing the accident. 
C. That the deceased was not guilty of any con-
tributory negligence. 
Based upon these Findings and Conclusions, the 
Court entered judgment denying plaintiff, as an heir of 
deceased, any reeovery, but decreed that plaintiff should 
recover, as representative of the two minor children and 
for their exclusive benefit, the sum of Five Thousand 
Dollars ( $5,000.00). 
Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which said 
motion was denied and overruled. 
2. 
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This appeal involves ouly t"·o questions: 
1. Was the neglig-ence of the defendant the proxi-
mate cause of the accident and resulting~ death 
of deceased 1 
~. In view of the Findings of Fact, as made by 
the Court, \Yas the deceased herself g11ilty of 
contributory neg·ligence as a matter of law 
\vhich \vould bar any right of recovery for 
the benefit of the two minor children~ 
3. As a necessary corollary thereto, should the 
Court have _granted defendant's motion for 
new trial' 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
This being an action at law, and the trial Court 
having found the defendant guilty of negligence and the 
Court having also found the plaintiff guilty of con-
tributory negligence, we shall confine onr·selves _to a 
statement of such facts deemed necessary to an under-
standing of the points raised on this appeal. 
Grant Avenue is a through highway extending in 
a Northerly and Southerly· ·direction through Ogden 
City. Patterson ~venue .extends in a generally Easterly 
and Westerly direction and intersects Grant Avenue. 
At the point of ·intersection, stop signs were maintained 
on Patterson Avenue, requiring East and West traffic 
to stop before entering said intersection. 
Weber County maintains a fire station on 12th 
Street, a short distance West of Washington Boulevard. 
It owned two fire trucks as a part of its fire fighting 
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equipment. Each truck was equipped with· modern and 
up-to-date sirens and red headlights. All of said equip-
ment was in good working condition. The defendant 
was and for a number of years had been the Fire Chief 
of Weber County. 
On the evening of July 23, 1948, at approximately 
7 :45 p. m., a fire alarm was received at the station, ad-
vising that there was a fire burning some buildings at 
3605 Adams Avenue (said buildings being located South 
of and outside the corporate limits of Ogden City). 
Both fire trucks im.media tely responded to the call. De-
fendant drove the largest truck (designated in the record 
as No. 2) on lead. He was accompanied by an assist-
ant who rode in the driver's seat on the right, whose 
duty it was to sound the siren. The smaller truck, 
designated No. 1, followed a short distance behind. It 
was driven by a fellow fireman and similarly another 
employee accompanied this driver, whose duty likewise 
was to sound its sirens. 
The trucks proceeded West on 12th Street to Wall 
Avenue, then proceeded South to Patterson Avenue (lo-
cated midway between 30th and 31st Streets), a distance 
of 18lh blocks South of 12th Street. At this point Wall 
Avenue was blocked by reason of road construction. 'rhe 
fire trucks therefore turned East on Patterson, Truck 
No.2 being approximately one-half block ahead of Truck 
No. 1, and continued Easterly from Wall to Grant Ave-
nue, a ~istance of two full blocks, each block being· 660 
feet in length, excluding· the width of the streets. The 
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The trial l~ourt found that defendant \Vas respond-
ing to a fire alarm, that said truck \Vas an authorized 
emergency vehicle as defined by the lav\rs of Utah, that 
it was equipped \vith a la,yful siren, bell and red signal 
lights, that said siren \Ya.s sounded during the entire 
course of the trip from the fire station and that the ~ed 
lights \Yere also lighted. While the Court made no 
specific findings, the evidence disclosed and we assume 
the Court inferentially found that the other fire truck 
which was follo·w·ing a short distance behind likewise 
sounded its siren continuously over the entire distance. 
The Folkmans lived in Plain City, some miles to the 
Northwest of Ogden. They intended to attend the rodeo 
performance in the·city stadium on the evening of July 
23rd. The performance opened at 8 :15 p. m. Plaintiff 
drove the car, accompanied by his. wife, the deceased; 
and their two small children. They came into Ogden 
City on Wall Avenue. However, when they reached 
21st Street plaintiff turned East to Grant (two blocks). 
They had arranged to leave the baby ~th deceased's 
parents, who resided at 32nd and Porter Avenue, while 
they attended the rodeo performance. Therefore, in-
stead of continuing on East to the rodeo, they turned 
South and proceeded along Grant Avenue, intending to 
continue to 32nd Street, thence East to Porter Avenue. 
It is conceded, therefore, that as plaintiff proceeded 
South on Grant A venue the two fire trucks were like-
wise proceeding South on Wall Avenue, two blocks to 
the West. It was an ordinary warm summer evening. 
The sun had not yet set. The deceased was sitting in 
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the front seat on the West or right-hand side. The 
front ear windows were down. Deceased's hearing and 
eyesight were good. The same is true of the plaintiff. 
When they reached a point some three blocks to the 
.North of the intersection in question, they heard the 
siren, which seemed to be to their North and West. They 
proceeded a. short distance, and upon hearing the siren 
a second time, they pulled toward the curb and stopped. 
Thereafter they continued Southward along Grant Ave-
nue, traveling at a speed of about twenty miles per hour. 
Plaintiff testified his brakes were good and that 
he could stop his car in a distance of approximately 
ten feet. (Tr. 20). He testified tnat neither he nor his 
wife heard the siren or saw the fire truck approaching 
the intersection until a moment before the impact, and 
the Court found that plaintiff did not see_ the truck 
until a few seconds before the impact, when it was too 
late to avoid the collision. The Court, however, made 
no findings as to whether deceased saw the truck or 
heard the siren before this time. It is inferentially as-
sumed that the Court concluded that sh~ did not. 
Witnesses called by both plaintiff and defendant 
and who resided in the vicinity heard the siren before 
and as the trucks proceeded East on Patterson. Some 
of these witnesses were inside their residences. One 
was in the back yard hanging out her clothes. One was 
driving his c.ar Northward on Grant Avenue. Others 
were sitting on their frorit porches. And from this 
evidence the Court found that the siren was continuously 
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Plaintiff testified that the deceased gave no warn-· 
ing of the approach of the fire truck as they proceeded 
along Grant .A venue and entered the intersection. The 
evidence sho,ved that the house on the Northwest corner 
of the intersection "~as back a considerable distanc.e 
from Patterson and Grant, (See plaintif's Exhibit A.), 
and that 'Yhile there ":ere some shade trees in front of 
the house, they did not interfere with the view and the 
Court expressly found that each driver had an unobstruc-
ted view of the other for a distance of 150 feet hack of 
the intersection line. 
As before noted, the cars collided in the vicinity of 
the center of the intersection. The fire truck came to 
a stop at or near the Southeast corner. As a result 
of the collision, Marie P. Folkman received fatal in-
JUries. 
The trial Court concluded from the evidence that 
the defendant was guilty of negligence in the operatio 
hat the plaintiff himself 'vas ilt ·of contributor 
of said truck. e rial Court also found and conclude 
neg 1gence, an he also found t at plaintiffs' negligence 
could not be imputed to the deceased. 
The trial Court further found that at the time of 
the accident the deceased was holding· the baby in her 
arms ''and that her attention was fully occupied by the 
children." We can find no evidence in this record to 
support this so-called Finding, which is more in the, 
nature of a conclusion apparently deduced by the Court 
in an attempt to explain deceased's conduct. 
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The Court further found that deceased did not know 
''nor by the exercise of reasonable care and caution could 
she or should she have known of the approach of said 
emergency vehicle by reason of the sounding of the said 
siren or by the presence of the red lights on the front of 
the vehicle.'' 
It is our contention that this is not a Finding of 
Fact but is also in the nature of a Conclusion \Vhich is 
contrary to and can find no support from the evidence 
and the Findings made by the Court as to the facts. 
The·se matters will be discussed more in detail here-
after. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Appellant relies upon the following errors commit-
ted by the trial Court for a reversal of the judgment of 
the Court below: 
1. (A) The Court erred in making and entering 
that part of Finding No. 12 as follows: 
''and that at said time and place her at-
tention was fully occupied by the child in 
her arms and her other four-year-old child 
in the rear seat.'' 
(B) Also the following portion of Finding No. 
12: "That said 1\ia.rie P. Folkman did not 
know nor by the exercise of reasonable 
care and caution could she or should she 
have known of the approach of said emer-
gency vehicle by reason of the sounding 
of said siren or by the presence of the red 
signal lights on the front of said vehicle.'' 
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) .L\.l~o the following· portion of Finding No. 
12 : ''That the collision and accident here-
inbefore referred to \vas not through any 
faul\t, uegligoe~c~ Oil' \vi.lful misconduct 
on the part of said Niarie P. Folkman, nor 
\Vas she guilty of any contributory negli-
gence in any way.'' 
(D) Als.o the follo\ving portion of Finding No. 
12 : '' S·aid Marie P. Folkman did, how-
ever, as soon as she saw the approaching 
vehicle a moment or two before the acci-
dent, warn the said Clifford G. Folkman 
of the approach thereof, at which tiine it 
was too late to avoid a collision.'' 
Findings (A) and (D) are not supported by , 
any evidence in the case. They partake of in-
ferences or conclusions erroneously deduced by 
the trial Court from the evidence and infer- \ 
ences logically deducible therefrom, and are in-
consistent with the Findingsof Fact made by 
the Court. (B) and (C) are not Findings of 
Fact at all, but merely inferences or conclus-
ions erroneously deduced by the trial Court 
and said conclusions or inferences. are incon-
sistent with the Findings· of Fact and the un-
disputed evidence. 
2. The Court erred in entering Conclusions of 
Law No. 1 and 2. The same are not supported 
by the Findings and are against .law. 
3. The Court err~d in entering judgment against 
this defendant for the reason that it is not sup-
ported in the Findings of Fact or the evidenc.e, 
but is contrary thereto and against law. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. The Court erred in not finding that the de-
ceased, .Marie P. Folkman, was, as a matter 
of law, guilty of contributory negligence which 
caused or proximately contributed to causing 
said accident and her resulting death. 
5. The Court erred in denying and overruling de-
fendant's motion for new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. AS HERETOFORE INDICATED, IT IS 
OUR CONTENTION THAT FINDING NO. 
12 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND IS ABSOLUT.ELY INCON-
SISTENT WITH THE OTHER FINDINGS 
MADE BY THE COURT WITH RESPECT 
TO HOW THE ACCIDENT HAPPENED. 
Furthermore, we contend that this so-called Finding 
of Fact is not really a Finding of Fact at all, but par-
takes largely of inferences or deductions which the 
Court erroneously deduced from the evidence and is 
inconsistent therewith. 
We further contend that there is no evidence what-
soever to support that part of Finding No. 12 (A) that 
at the time of the accident the deceased's attention was 
fully occupied by the child in her arms and her other 
four-year-old child in the rear seat. We have searched 
this record to find any evidence to sustain this con-
clusion. It seems to us that the Court. merely drew 
this conclusion in an attempt to explain deceased's acts 
or failure to act for her OW11 safety. We shall refer 
further to these matters ill connection with our dis-
cussion under Point 2. 
10 
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POIN'r ~- IX VIEW OF THE OTHER FINDINGS 
~l.A.l)E BY 'fHE COURT UPON EITHER 
DISPr~rrED QUESTIONS OF FACT OR 
lTPON UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, WE 
t~ONTEND THAT THE DECEASED WAS 
HERSELF GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AND THAT SUCH CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGE·NCE CAUSED OR 
CONTRIBUTED PROXIMATELY TO 
THE CAUSING OF SAID ACCIDENT. 
The Court found that the fire truck in question be-
longed to Weber County, that it was an emergency ve-
hicle as defined by the laws of the state of Utah, that 
it was equipped with a lawful siren, bell and red signal 
lights, which were lighted, ·that at and preceding- the 
collision it \vas responding to a fire alarm, that the 
siren thereon was sounded c.ontinuously as. the fire truck 
proceeded Easterly on Patterson Avenue, and that it 
had been sounded during the eourse of its entire trip 
from the fire station, a distance of more than twenty-
two full blocks. That it was proceeding· Easterly on 
-Patterson Avenue at a speed of about thirty-five miles 
per hour. That the accident happened about eight p. m. 
All the evidence was to the effect that it was not yet 
dark. 
T.he Court further found that deceased was. sitting 
in the front seat of the car, to the right of her husband, 
as they proceeded South on Grant Avenue; that they 
·were traveling at a speed about twenty miles per hour. 
The· evidence is undisputed that the brakes on plain-
tiff's car were in good condition and that he could have 
stopped his car in about ten feet. 
11 
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The Court further found that the evemng was 
warm, the weather clear, and the side front windows of 
the ear were down, and the hearing and eyesight of the 
deceased were normal. That when about three blocks 
North of the point of collision the driver heard the 
siren (the undispuated evidence is that they both heard 
the srien) and that after they had pro~eeded another 
block or two South on Grant Avenue he pulled toward 
the curb and stopped, so that both plaintiff and deceased 
. were put upon notice of the presence of an emergency 
vehicle in the vicinity. Notwithstanding· this fact, plain-
tiff continued to drive along Grant Avenue, entering 
the intersection near the same time as the fire truck, 
and the two cars collided near the center of the inter-
section. The Court further found that plaintiff had 
an unobstructed view of Patterson Avenue for a dis-
tance of 150 feet West of the intersection when he 
reached a point 150 feet North of said intersection, and 
inferentially, at least, found that such unobstructed view 
continued from said point to the point of collision. At 
least the evidence is without conflict on this point. 
Then the Court found that plaintiff was himself 
guilty of -contributory negligence in failing to use reason-
able care and caution and in failing to keep a proper 
lookout for the approach of the emergency vehicle as 
he proceeded toward and subsequently entered said 
intersection. 
Notwithstanding the existence of all of these facts 
and the undisputed fact that the plaintiff was herself 
in a better position to see the approach of the fire 
12 
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truck and to hear the siren as the truck approached the 
intersection, the Court found or concluded or inferred 
that · 4 by the exerrise of reasonable care and caution 
deceased could not and should not have known of the 
approach of said emerg-ency v-ehicle, notwit~standing the 
continuous sounding of said siren, the red signal lights, 
and that her vie\v was clear and unobstructed for a 
distance of 150 feet before they entered the intersec-
tion.'' 
LAW 
Appellant is undoubtedly bound by the Court's find-
ing that the defendant was guilty of negligence, even , 
though we are disposed to disagree with the same. Plain-
tiff is likewise bound by the Court's finding that be 
was guilty of contributory negligenc.e and that his con-
tributory negligence contributed proximately to the 
injuries. What is the situation with respect to the de-
ceased·~ The question of the degree of care which a 
guest in an automobile must exercise for his own safety 
has been before this Court many times. We think the 
following excerpt from the case of 
Atwood vs. Utah Light and Railway Company, 
44 Utah 366, 140 Pac. 137 
is now recognized as the law of this jurisdiction: 
"It no doubt is the law, as contended by appel-
lant's counsel, that every occupant of a vehicle, 
in which he is riding, must always exercise ordi-
nary care for his own safety, and if, by the exer-
cise of such care, he could avoid injury to him-
self, but fails to do so, he cannot recover, re-
13 
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gardless of the fact that he had no control or 
direction of the vehicle in which he was riding 
at the time of the accident and injury, but as has 
been well stated by the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota in Howe vs. Minneapolis R. Co., 62 ~linn. 
71, 64 NW 102, 30 LRA 684, 54 Am. St. Rep. 
616, 'We think that it would hardly occur to a 
man of ordinary prudence, when riding as a pas-
senger with a competent driver who he had no 
reason to suppose· was neglecting his duty, that 
he was required, when approaching a railway 
crossing, to· exercise the same degree of vigilance 
in looking and listening for approaching trains 
·that he would if he himself had the control and 
management of the team.' This seems to us good 
sense as well as good law. ' ' 
Many of the cases are collected and discussed in the 
rec.ent case of 
Earle vs. S. L. and Utah R. Corp~, 
109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877, 
wherein this Court, after quoting the above excerpt from 
the Atwood case, continued as follows: 
''The Court then went on to say that while he 
need not exercise the same degree of vigilance 
as the driver, the guest could not sit still without 
protest and allow the driver to g·o forward into 
a position of imminent peril. In conclusion the 
Court held the driver's negligence not imputable 
to the guest where it was shown that she had no 
control over the vehicle and no reasonable appre-
hension of peril. Citing Lockhead vs. Jensen, 42 
Utah 99, 129 P. 347. In Lawrence vs. Denver & 
R. G. R. Company, 52 Utah 414, 174 P. 817, 820, 
14 
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it \YH s said: ·The only inference permissible from 
the eYidence is that the \Yarnings and signals . 
mentioned \Vere gi Yen. The alleg·ed failure of 
plaintiff, Ann Bird, to hear one or more- of them, 
their failure to observe the smoke issuing from 
the engine, or to hear the rumble and noise of 
the fast moving- train in time to have avoided 
the accident, cannot, in the face of the undisputed 
ec·i.deuce, be accouHted for or explained on any 
theory other than that of indifference, inatten-
h~on, and lack of ordinary care a.nd caution on 
their part. Each of them testified that he was 
familiar with the crossing, having passed over 
it many times. Furthermore, it is a well recog-
nized rule that a steam railroad track in actual 
use is a constant warning of danger, and its 
presence is sufficient, as a matter of law, to put 
a reasonably c.areful person approaching it on 
notice of such danger and it is the duty of such 
person.to look and listen before crossing it.' The 
holding therein was that the guest, failing to see 
the train, where a view vvas apparently unob-
structed, and warning signals given, was guilty 
of contributory ne·gligence as a matter of law.'' 
We shall not attempt to cite all the Utah cases 
dealing with the subject as many of them have been cited 
and referred to not only in the Earle case but other de-
cisions. However we do desire to refer to one or two 
other cases which we think pertinent. 
Cowan vs. Salt Lake Railroad Company, 
56 Utah 94, 189 Pac. 599. 
In this case the Court makes observations concerning the 
Lawrence case and points out that in that case the plain-
tiff (guest) sat in the front seat of the automobile and 
15 
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that he. therefore had the same if not a better oppor-
. tunty than the driver to keep a lookout for and to see 
warning signals of an oncoming train and see its ap-
proach, and the duty imposed was that he was required 
to make vigilant use of his senses and to exercise ordi-
nary care to avoid injury. 
Counsel will no doubt contend that these cases are 
all r:ailroad eases and that a different duty devolves 
upon a guest when approaching a railroad crossing than 
under other circumstanc.es. We find nothing in these 
cases which seems to bear out this contention. The duty 
to exercise due care is always present. There are certain 
facts inherent in railroad crossing cases not found in 
other cases, but merely because the collision is between 
an automobile and a railroad train at a public crossing· 
makes no difference in measuring the duty of the g11est 
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. If there 
are present other facts, . equally as cog-ent in respect to 
giving adequate warning, there certainly is no reason 
why a different standard of care could or should be 
required. 
Maybee vs. Maybee, 79· Utah 583, 
11 P. 2d 972. 
This case did not involve a railroad or public crossing. 
The opinion, however, quotes from the Atwood case, 
the Jackson vs. Transit Company case, and then sum-
marizes as follow: 
''Such cases (no reference to railroad crossings) 
show that a guest or invitee in an automobile 
having no control or direction of the manage~ 
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ment of it, is not held to the care required of 
the opera tor and has a rig·ht to rely on the pru-
dence, care and skillfulness of the operator. In 
the absence of facts indicating an absense of such 
qualities, if the guest or invitee knows that the 
operator is incompetent or careless or u.nawa.re 
of approaching daHger or is not tak·iffltg proper 
precautions to avoid ·it, it again becomes the 
duty of the guest or i.nvitee to caution or notify 
the operator. So, too, if the guest or invitee sees 
or kno,vs that the operator is operating. the auto 
at an excessive, unla,vful or dangerous speed 
or in ·tiolation of traffic rules and regulations 
or other~v-ise is mismanag,ing or driving the auto 
in a careless ma.nner, it again is the duty of the 
invitee or guest to protest and ask the operator 
to desist aud if the guest or invitee fails so to 
do, he may be regarded as having consented to 
or acquiesced in such violati1on or negligence of 
the opera-tor rendering the guest or invitee him-
self personally gu.ilty of negligence." 
It is also well-established that while one person may 
have the right-of-way, this right is not absolute so as 
to protect the defendant in all cases and violation of 
the right-of-way does not relieve the other person from 
negligence. 
Section 57-7-140, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
''Emergency Vehicles. 
(a) Upon the immediate approach of an author-
ized emergency vehicle, \vhen the driver is giving 
audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or 
bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield 
the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to 
a position parallel to, and as close as possible 
17 
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to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway 
clear of any interesction and shall. stop and re-
main~ in such position until the authorized emer-
gency vehicle has passed, except when other,vise 
directed by a police officer. 
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the 
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from 
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety 
of all persons using the highway.'' 
The deceased was in as good a position, or even 
better, than the driver to see the approaching vehicle 
as it came up Patterson Avenue, to hear the noise of 
its approach, which all the witnesses testified was very 
considerable, and certainly to hear· the siren, while they 
were approaching the intersection. While it is impos-
sible to put into the record the actual sound of a. fire 
siren, yet this Court judicially knows that the eerie 
and almost blood-curdling sounds emitted from a fire 
engine is such as to give anyone notice of its immediate 
approach. If it were· merely a queston of deceased's 
failing to see a car approaching into the intersection, 
such conduct might be explained or condoned, but ho"· 
can one be oblivious to the approach of two fire trucks 
which have traveled a distance of 22 blocks with their 
sirens continuously sounding, especially when they were 
proceeding· in the same direction on parallel streets only 
two blocks apart. The fact that they heard the siren 
and stopped two or three blocks to the North further 
put them on notice to he on the lookout. Likewise de-
ceased's failure to he.ar or see the approach of the fire 
engine as it came up Patterson Av~nue for. two full 
blocks is likewise beyond human understanding or com-
18 
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prehension. Especially is this true when we next con-
sider the finding of the trial Court that deceased had a 
clear and unobstructed Yie\v do'vn Patterson Avenue 
for a distance of 150 feet, when they 'vere 150 feet 
North of the intersection, and it naturally follows that 
as they approached nearer her view on Patterson length-
ened proportionately. 
The Court found that they were traveling at a rate 
of speed of t\Yenty miles per hour; the fire truck at a 
speed of thirty-fiYe miles per hour and the cars collided 
near the center of the intersection; so that when the 
fire truck was 150 feet West of the West line of the 
intersection the car in \Yhich plaintiff \vas riding would 
have to be approximately 100 feet North of the point of 
contact. The plaintiff testified he could have stopped 
his ear in ten feet. We therefore are confronted with 
the situation where deceased sat by without giving the 
driver any \Yarning or otherwise attempting to avoid a 
collision, while they traveled for a distance of nearly 
100 feet into the path of an oncoming fire truck with 
its siren wide open and which indicated no intention on 
the part of the driver to slow down as it approached the 
intersection, and therefore gave ample warning of de-
fendant's intent to go through, as defendant clearly 
had the right to do, under the provisions of the above 
quoted statute. 
Quoting from the Montague case: 
"It certainly taxes one's credulity to believe that 
one riding in the front seat of an automobile with 
every opportunity to see and hear what is going 
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on around her neither heard the siren nor saw 
the fire truck as they approached the intersec-
tion.'' 
But if such is the case, then as stated by this Court 
in the Lawrence vs. D. & G. G. W. case cited supra, her 
alleged ·failure to see and hear the approaching fire 
truck in time to have avoided the accident cannot, in 
the face of the undisputed evidence (and the Court's 
findings) be aecounted ~or or explained on any theory 
other than that of indifference, inattention, and lack 
of ordinary care and caution on her own part. It must 
be remembered, in this connection, that the plaintiff 
testified that deceased gave no warning, and that if 
she had h~ could have stopped before reaching the point 
of collision. 
The only logical explanation is that these parties 
were anxious to get to the rodeo performance and took 
the chanee of trying to beat the fire truck through the 
intersection, because the car preceding them was doing 
the same thing. 
It is true that in ttte IDarle vs. S. L. and Utah R: 
Corp. case this Court held that under the fact of that 
case the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence 
presented a question of fact for the jury. A reading 
of that case convinced us that it was considered by this 
Court to be a ''borderline'' case. However the facts 
in the Earle case are clearly distinguishable. In that 
case the following facts are to be noted: 
A. The plaintiff's view of the approaching car 
was obstructed by orchards, trees and vegetation 
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gTo,ving- along the East side of the hig~h,vay. 
In our ease the Court found that there was no such ob-
struction. 
B. 4--\. question of fact w'as presented for the jury 
as to \Yhether or not \varnings and signals of its 
approach \Yas g·iven before the electric. car 
reached the point where it entered upon the high~ 
\Yay, at 'vhic.h time, 'vhen the signal was ad-
mittedly given, the accident eould not have been 
avoided. 
In our case the trial Court found that such warning'S 
were in fac.t given continuously from the time the fire 
truck left the fire station and that the siren was sounded 
continuously during the entire two blocks while it pro-
ceeded up Patterson Avenue and entered the inter-
section. 
C. An electric car makes little or no noise, un-
like a train, so that the only way one has of 
knowing of its approach is by either seeing 
the car or hearing the warning whistle. 
In our case the continuous sounding of a siren is much 
more clearly heard than a whistle of an electric train. 
D. The question presented in the Earle case 
was whether the plaintiff's knowledge that 
they were about to c.ross a railroad track at a 
public crossing was sufficient to put them on 
notice to look out for an oncoming electric 
car, even though its approach c.ould not be 
heard. 
In our case the actual knowledge of the· approach of the 
firetruck was present and apparent, both to the senses 
of the eye and the ear. 
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We therefore contend that the ruling in the Earle 
case does not control in this case, but that the arguments 
and citations referred to therein amply support our 
position. 
That it is the duty of this Court to declare one 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of la"T 
where no other reasonable inference is permissible can 
no longer be doubted. 
Conklin vs. Walsh, 193 P. 2d 437, 
------------U tab .. _______ ---· 
Hickok vs. Skinner, 190 P. 2d 514, 
· ------------Utah ____________ _ 
l\fingus vs. Olsson, 201 P. 2d 495, 
-----------~.ak-~ J.-.1 ~ p. 2-4, g 5 h A~t contenas, therefore, that the conduct of 
the deceased, interpreted in the light of the evidence 
and the findings of the trial Court on disputed questions 
of fact, admit of no other conclusion except that de-
ceased, as a matter of law, was guilty of contributory 
negligence and that such ·contributory negligence on her 
part contributed directly to the causing of this un-
fortunate accident, and that the so-called finding or 
conclusion of the Court that she was not gt1ilty of such 
· contributory negligence is not supported by the evidence 
or the law applicable thereto, and that judgment in 
fa.vor of plaintiff cannot be sustained. 
POINT 3. IF DECEASED WAS NOT GUILTY O:B_, 
CO.NTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, YET THE NEGLI-
GENCE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS 
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NOT rrHE PROXIl\IATE CAUSE OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
We base our c.ontention on this point by reaso·n of 
the reasoning contained in the case of 
Harratich vs. 0. S. L., 
70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100. 
As previously noted, the fire truck was visible to 
the deceased when it reached a distance of 150 feet 
West of the West line of the intersection. If the truck 
had not reached that point when the car in which de-
cedent was riding had reached a point 150 feet North 
of the intersection, yet the evidence is conclusive that 
when their car reached a point 100 feet North of the 
intersection the fire truck entered into full view. (The 
fire truck traveled 1.75 feet while the car traveled 1 
foot.) Applying the relative speeds of the two cars, 
as found by the trial Court, when the fire truck came 
into full view the car in which deceased wa.s riding was 
approximately 100 feet North of the point of collision, 
and, as a matter of fact, as plaintiff's car proceeded 
South from the 150 feet, his and deceased view would 
be lengthened beyond the point of 150 feet and the 
fire truck would have been back about 262 feet when 
plaintiff's car was 150 feet North of the intersection. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff could have stopped 
his car in a distance of ten feet and that he would have 
stopped his car had the deceased warned him of the 
approaching fire truck. Notwithstanding this fact, his 
car proceeded for a distance of at least 100 feet or more 
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while the oncoming fir·e· truck traveled at least 175 feet 
or more to the point of contact, and during this entire 
time the fire truck was visible to the eye and certainly 
the warning sound of the siren was visible to the ear, 
yet defendant made no effort to slow down the- fire 
truck, clearly indicating an intent on his part not to 
stop at the stop sign. 
Upon the reasoning set forth in the Haaratieh case, 
we contend that irrespective of the defendant's negli-
gence in failing to slow down and yield the right-of-way 
to the· plaintiff, yet defendant's negligence was not the 
proximate cause of the collision but that the sole, im-
mediate cause of the accident was the negligence of the 
plaintiff. 
POINT 4. FOR THE REASON-s HERETOFORE IN-
DICATED, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE 
GRANTED _DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LeRoy B. Young 
of Thatcher & Young 
O.gde·n, U tab 
Robert A. Burns, 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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